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8.1  Introduction 
Compared to the US.  Treasury bond (UST) market, the Japanese (JGB) and 
German (GGB) cash bond markets are illiquid, face more institutional “fric- 
tions” in the market-making process, and evidence a larger impact of  account- 
ing standards and regulatory restrictions on the trading strategies of  final in- 
vestors. Though the details of the corresponding bond futures contracts differ, 
there is at the same time notable similarity in the liquidities of  these futures 
contracts. Indeed, all three contracts are among the most liquid financial instru- 
ments traded globally. This paper explores the implications of the differences 
in institutional frictions in cash bond markets for the joint distributions of fu- 
tures and cash bond prices and, in particular, for the role of futures in the price 
discovery process for government bonds. 
Institutional arrangements typically change slowly over time, so identifica- 
tion of the effects of particular frictions from a single time series for a given 
country is often tenuous. Accordingly, I examine securities prices that are stra- 
tified along  several dimensions.  First, I consider three countries that are at 
different stages of the financial liberalization process and have different market 
organizations. There are also substantial differences  in the costs of  market 
making, which include the costs of financing and hedging the risks of  posi- 
tions; in accounting practices, which in some cases induce preferences for par 
bonds and affect attitudes toward coupon versus capital gain income; and in 
the objectives of portfolio managers and the implied trading practices. 
Second, the distributions of futures prices are compared with those of deliv- 
erable and nondeliverable bond prices and, within the deliverable sectors in 
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Germany and the United States, the prices of bonds with the same maturity but 
different deliverability  status. These comparisons reveal insights into the na- 
ture of illiquidity in the cash markets and the role of futures as a price discovery 
vehicle for illiquid bonds. The differences in liquidities of government bonds 
across the three countries are large and certainly much greater than the differ- 
ences that one typically  sees within the UST market. I interpret these differ- 
ences and the associated differences in the distributions of bond prices in the 
light of the differences in institutionalized frictions. 
The nature of informational spillovers from futures to cash prices has been 
widely  studied  at the  individual  market  level  (see, e.g., Stoll  and  Whaley 
[1990]; Schwarz and Laatsch [1991]; and Quan [1992]). To the extent that the 
implications of regulatory constraints for price behavior have been examined, 
the focus has typically been on such “micro” factors within futures markets as 
margin requirements, within-day price limits, and so forth. Much less attention 
has  been  given  to comparative analysis  of  the  implications  of  the  broader 
“macro” frictions outlined above for the joint distribution of cash and futures 
prices. Surely both types of frictions are important, though their effects may 
manifest themselves over different time frames. The daily and weekly  data 
studied in this paper are well suited to investigating the effects of institutional 
frictions on cash and futures relations that persist over days at the expense of 
identification  of the effects of  frictions that only affect within-day  cash and 
futures price changes. 
Though institutional frictions in cash markets might be expected to affect 
significantly the joint distribution of cash and futures prices, the nature of these 
effects does not seem a priori obvious. Consider for instance the relation be- 
tween the prices of a futures contract and an underlying deliverable bond. Fric- 
tions in the cash market that limit exploitation of deviations from the cost-of- 
carry relation might lead one to expect systematic violations of this “arbitrage” 
relation. On the other hand, the same frictions may compromise price discov- 
ery in the cash market to the extent that the market’s pricing of  cash instru- 
ments may be directly linked to the futures through the cost-of-carry relation. 
Indeed, I find that both scenarios occurred in the JGB and GGB markets during 
the sample period. 
No attempt is made to develop a formal model of  price discovery  in the 
presence  of  institutional frictions. Rather,  this  study  represents  an effort to 
characterize the properties of the distributions of cash and futures prices in 
order to guide such modeling efforts in the future. In section 8.2, I begin by 
comparing the institutional environments in which cash trading takes place in 
the United States, Germany, and Japan. Then descriptive statistics for the yields 
on government bonds are presented and interpreted in the light of the back- 
ground discussion on market structure. Comparing across the maturity spec- 
trum  within  a bond  market, the yield  distributions are found to be  notably 
different in Germany and Japan depending on whether the maturity of a bond 
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many and the United States also permit comparisons of yield distributions for 
bonds with identical maturities but different deliverability status. Overall, the 
findings from this preliminary analysis suggest that the presence of  a liquid 
futures market has a significant effect on the distributions of cash bond yields. 
In section 8.3, I overview the structure of the primary bond futures markets 
in the  three  countries. Then descriptive  statistics for futures prices  and the 
prices of individual deliverable bonds are presented and compared. Cash prices 
for deliverable bonds appear to inherit the distributional characteristics of fu- 
tures prices, especially in Germany and Japan. More direct evidence that fu- 
tures are central to price discovery in the presence of illiquid cash markets is 
presented for Japan, where at times cash bonds throughout the deliverable sec- 
tor  were  priced  directly  off  futures  in  terms  of  conversion-factor  adjusted 
prices. 
Concluding remarks are presented in section 8.4. 
8.2  Structural Impediments to Price Discovery in Cash Bond Markets 
The  price discovery process for newly issued bonds is accomplished through 
an auction with a known price (par) or coupon. The resulting yields embody 
all of the information about bond markets used by traders in formulating in- 
vestment  decisions,  as well as their own attitudes toward  risk and the con- 
straints they face in making portfolio allocations. The constraints include not 
only the limit of each trader’s wealth, but also the legal and accounting regula- 
tions that might limit participation of some types of traders in the cash market 
or limit their ability to hedge cash positions with derivative products. 
Subsequently  in  the  secondary  markets, price  discovery  is accomplished 
through organized trading in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. The markets for 
bonds are not all equally liquid or deep across the maturity  spectrum. While 
many factors contribute to the liquidity of secondary markets, I focus on three: 
(1) issuing patterns in the primary market, (2) the costs of financing positions 
for dealers making markets, and (3) accounting standards that influence sec- 
ondary market trading by final investors. 
Regular issuance at a specific maturity in relatively large size through auc- 
tions provides  a natural  set of  “benchmark” or reference bonds,  relative to 
which other bonds with comparable characteristics can be valued. Moreover, 
dealers have an incentive to maintain an active secondary market and accurate 
price  discovery  following a new  auction  as they place  their bonds.  Subse- 
quently, large issue sizes facilitate market participation by a wide variety of 
investors with  different portfolio  strategies and anticipated holding periods. 
Indeed, final investors who follow portfolio strategies with high turnover rates 
may prefer (collectively as an equilibrium) to trade primarily in the on-the-run 
I. This characteristic of the Japanese market was noted by Kikugawa and Singleton (1994) and 
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issues because a concentration of trading in these issues allows dealers to quote 
at relatively narrow spreads for large size.2 
Table 8.1 displays the maturities and frequencies of the auctions in the three 
countries we are considering. The United States has the largest number of ma- 
turity points at which new bonds are issued and the most regular issue calendar 
(at least quarterly). Newly  issued, on-the-run bonds serve as pricing bench- 
marks. The liquidity premiums associated with the benchmark status of these 
bonds are typically on the order of five to eight basis points (bp). 
Several different federal bonds are issued in germ an^.^ BUNDs (Bundesan- 
leihe) are issued on an irregular basis with maturities of eight to thirty years. 
Most of  the issuance has had a ten-year maturity, and issues with maturities 
over ten years have been rare. Historically the issue sizes of BUNDs have been 
quite small, ranging from DM2 to DM4 billion. However, starting in 1990,  the 
federal issuing authorities increased  the issue sizes and started augmenting 
existing issues rather than always opening new issues. Consequently, the issue 
sizes have grown substantially and now regularly exceed DM 10 billion. This 
change in issuing policy has contributed substantially to the liquidity  of the 
BUND markets. New issue premiums are ten to fifteen bp in the five-year sec- 
tor, and have been closer to twenty bp in the ten-year sector. Irregular issuance 
remains a limiting factor in price discovery and liquidity, however, as the values 
of both the option to retrade and the delivery option associated with the futures 
contract may be affected by the uncertainty surrounding new issue announce- 
ment~.~ 
BOBLs (Bundesobligationen) are issued on an irregular schedule in sizes 
between DM4 and DMlO billion  (a minimum  issue size of DM4 billion  is 
required for the bond to satisfy the delivery criteria into the Deutsche Termin- 
borse  [DTB]  five-year  futures  contract).  SCHATZs  (Bundesschatzanwei- 
sungen) are issued bimonthly and may have maturities of one to seven years, 
though  most issues are in the four- to five-year maturity  sector with typical 
sizes of about DM5-6  billion. The reference bonds for the under-five-year ma- 
turity bonds are current or seasoned issues of these medium-term notes. There 
are large differences in liquidity among reference and off-the-run bonds at the 
short end of the German yield curve, with BUNDs under five years to maturity 
being particularly illiquid. Traders sometimes express the view that the liquid- 
ity of  the cash market compares more favorably with the futures in the five- 
year than in the ten-year sector in Germany. The regular issue calendar may be 
a factor underlying this view. 
Until recently, all of the JGB issuance with maturity less than ten years was 
2. The notion that the right to  retrade in  a liquid market lowers yields relative to otherwise 
equivalent illiquid bonds is proposed by  Amihud and Mendelson (1991), among others, as an 
explanation of  the spreads between bill and seasoned bond yields of  the same maturity in the 
UST market. 
3. See McLean (1993) for an overview of the structure of the German bond market. 
4. Since unification of  East  and West Germany, Unity  bonds have  been  issucd with ten-year 
maturities that are essentially equivalent to BUNDs. And Treuhand bonds have been issued in both 
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Table 8.1  Structure of Government Bond Markets 
Auctions  Futures 
Maturity  Frequency  Maturity  Deliverables  Taxes 







Germany  SCHATZ 1-7 
BOBL 5 
BUND 8-30 


















CBT 5 yr  5 yr  None 
CBT 10 yr 
CBT Bond  15-30  yr 
6 1/2-10  yr 
DTB 5 yr  3 1/2-5  yr  Withholding 
LIFFE 5 yr 
LIFFE 10 yr  8 1/2-10  yr 
DTB 10 yr 
JGB 10 yr  7-11  yr  Transactions 
Withholding 
Nores: CBT denotes Chicago Board of  Trade futures, and  CBT Bund is the futures on the long 
bond. DTB denotes the Deutsche Terminborse, and LZFFE denotes the London International Fi- 
nancial Futures Exchange. 
issued with an original maturity of ten years. Starting in November  1993, the 
Japanese Ministry of  Finance has issued a four-year bond and more recently 
has  started  issuing  six-year bonds. The issuing process  in  Japan  is closely 
linked to the annual fiscal plans by the Ministry of Finance. Projections are 
made in December each year for the following fiscal year starting in March. 
Ten-year and four-year bonds are auctioned monthly, though the exact amount 
and coupon may not be known long in advance, since the Ministry of Finance 
adjusts issue sizes depending on its views about the impact of supply on the 
market at the time of issuance. The six-year issues have been on an irregular 
schedule. 
The benchmark selection process in Japan is different. Though newly issued 
ten-year bonds often trade at a premium to their seasoned counterparts, these 
bonds are not the most liquid in their sector. Instead there is a specific bond- 
typically between eight and ten years to maturity-which  is designated as the 
benchmark bond. A majority of the trading volume in all JGBs is concentrated 
in this one bond. As a consequence, this bond trades at a lower yield (rich) to 
JGBs with similar maturities, with the difference occasionally reaching more 
than twenty bp. This “benchmark premium” fluctuates substantially over time, 
so there is no simple relation between the yield on the benchmark and other 
are guaranteed by  the German government and deliverable into the associated futures contracts, 
they are not treated as equivalent by  the market and often trade at relatively high yields (cheap) 
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off-the-run bonds. Partly as a consequence, the JGB benchmark does not serve 
as the primary benchmark for price discovery of other JGBS.~  Instead, the on- 
the-run ten-year  and ex-benchmark bonds  serve as key reference bonds for 
pricing. Ex-benchmarks play a key role in price discovery since they have rela- 
tively large issue sizes and, after losing their benchmark status, they maintain 
some of their liquidity relative to bonds that were never benchmarks. There are 
now ex-benchmark bonds along the entire maturity spectrum under ten years. 
A tentative issuing plan for twenty-year bonds is also developed in Decem- 
ber, but the issuing calendar is irregular, with new issues announced usually 
within a month of  the auction. In the superlong (twenty-year)  sector, certain 
bonds among those with the larger issue sizes have emerged as reference bonds 
for pricing and evaluating the shape of the yield curve. The typical issue size 
and the trading volumes in these bonds are small compared to the JGB bench- 
mark, though recently the turnover in the secondary market for superlongs has 
at times been as high or higher than some ex-benchmarks. 
Large issue sizes and regular issue calendars are not sufficient to guarantee 
that the market for a bond will be liquid or deep. Another important consider- 
ation is the dealers’ cost of making markets. One particularly important influ- 
ence on a dealer’s cost structure is the inventory position that a dealer maintains 
for facilitating flow trading. Limited secondary trading in a bond may influence 
both the ability of dealers to satisfy demand for this bond and their willingness 
to absorb large blocks from sellers. Neither consideration would be a major 
issue if dealers were willing to maintain large inventories of individual bonds. 
However, these positions must be hedged  against interest rate risk. Further- 
more,  large  inventories  tie  up  financing  lines,  lead  to  regulatory  capital 
charges, and may affect the dealer’s credit rating. 
These costs can be largely avoided in the presence of an active bond bor- 
rowing  and lending market, as dealers can efficiently  carry  small inventory 
positions.  Borrowing  of  bonds  can  be  effected  in  two  ways:  buy/sell 
agreements  in  which  the  purchase  and  sale  prices  are  determined  on 
the agreement date with  a difference that reflects the borrowing rate, and a 
rep0 agreement, which is essentially a collateralized loan for which title to the 
bonds does not change hands. The rep0 market is well established in the United 
States and is actively used by dealers for financing their inventory positions. 
Bond lending is also viewed as an important source of portfolio yield enhance- 
ment by institutional investors. These borrowing markets are somewhat less 
developed in Germany. Both buyhell and rep0 arrangements are available, with 
the former being the most common. 
Japan has the least well developed borrowingAending market. There is no 
rep0 market; all borrowing is based on a buykell arrangement. Moreover, a 
dealer cannot “fail”-fail  to deliver bonds on the settlement date-in  Japan. 
5. This is not to suggest that market participants do not condition on the yield on the benchmark 
when setting prices of nonbenchmark bonds, but rather that other bonds are likely to serve as the 
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While failing is a last resort and costly action, the possibility of failure facili- 
tates a dealer’s efforts at making active markets in bonds. Potential sources of 
bonds for borrowing are also somewhat limited by internal policies of financial 
institutions or regulatory considerations. For instance, banks that lend bonds 
must treat this activity as a risky loan with a 100 percent risk weighting under 
international capital standards, and, consequently, they may be reluctant to lend 
around fiscal year ends. 
Investment practices by final investors have several additional significant ef- 
fects on the liquidity of bond markets. In all three markets, there is some ten- 
dency for institutional  investors to hold  (with limited  intentions of  selling) 
newly acquired bonds in their portfolios. The motivations for this activity vary 
across countries as does their importance for the overall level of trading activity 
in secondary markets. In the United States, most institutional accounts must 
mark to market their bond portfolios on a regular basis. Therefore, buyhell 
decisions are made in terms of current market values. In contrast, in both Ger- 
many and Japan, many accounts carry bonds at book value. Consequently, ac- 
cepted accounting standards may  discourage investors from selling bonds at 
below book value and, thereby, contribute to a buy and hold approach to port- 
folio management.  Buy and hold  investment strategies reduce the effective 
supplies of bonds into the market. 
There are also institutionally induced preferences for high coupon bonds in 
Japan, associated in large part with the requirement that insurance companies 
pay most policy dividends from coupon income and not capital gain income. 
Similarly, tax policies in Germany induce a preference for low coupon bonds 
so that a larger share of a bond’s total return is in the form of a capital gain. At 
times, these coupon effects manifest themselves as notable spreads between 
otherwise equivalent high and low coupon bonds. 
Related accounting standards also increase the desire for par bonds. In Ger- 
many, bonds purchased above par must be booked at par, so that the capital loss 
implicit in the premium over par must be realized immediately for accounting 
purposes. A similar accounting “friction” exists in Japan: for bonds purchased 
at a discount, investors can include only the coupon payment in current income 
(they must defer accretion to par); for bonds purchased  at a premium,  they 
must amortize the premium, and this amortization overstates the economic re- 
duction in value associated with the passage of time. Consequently, there is an 
accounting  bias  toward  par  bonds,  with  premium  bonds  tending  to  trade 
cheaply relative to otherwise comparable low coupon bonds when both are 
selling at a premium, and vice versa when both are discounted. 
In summary, there are notable differences in institutional factors affecting 
price discovery in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Consequently, the 
nature of the benchmarks that market participants use for assessing value in 
the cash markets varies across markets. So does the quality of the benchmarks, 
in the sense that not all benchmarks are equally free of important institutional 
effects that may lead a reference bond to be valued implicitly by  a different 
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If  the institutional frictions outlined above have significant  effects on the 
price discovery process, then, in light of the differences across countries, one 
might expect the distributions of bond yields also to differ. To investigate this 
possibility, descriptive statistics for a cross-section of bonds along the maturity 
spectrums were computed using daily and weekly data over the period October 
I, 1991, through November 30, 1993. The characteristics of the bonds selected 
for the three countries are presented in table 8.2. When a choice was available, 
UST bonds with  above-average issue sizes were  selected among those with 
similar maturities.6 In addition to a cross-section of bonds across the maturity 
spectrum, pairs of bonds with identical or nearly identical maturities, but dif- 
ferent status regarding deliverability  into the five- and ten-year futures, were 
examined. This comparison is possible because bonds that are deliverable into 
the five- and ten-year contracts must have an original issue maturity that satis- 
fies the delivery criterion. To  make this comparison, the sample periods for 
some bonds were shorter than the full sample, since over the two-year sample 
period some bonds that were deliverable lost their deliverability  status. The 
delivery status of the bonds is indicated in the last column of table 8.2.’ Similar 
criteria were used in selecting GGBs, and similar comparisons are possible. In 
addition, we  compare the  distributions  of  short-term  BOBLs  and  BUNDs, 
none of which are deliverable into the five-year futures. 
In the case of Japan, we chose ex-benchmark bonds since they serve as the 
local benchmark bonds along the yield curve.8  All JGBs satisfying the maturity 
criterion  are deliverable,  so a deliverablehondeliverable comparison  is  not 
possible. 
All of the statistics are for the first differences of  the logarithms of  bond 
yields. In the cases of the United States and Japan, yields are measured on a 
bond equivalent yield basis, and for Germany, quoted yields were used. Results 
for daily  and  weekly  data  are displayed  in tables  8.3 and  8.4, respectively. 
There is a tendency for the annualized standard deviations to decline with ma- 
tijrity (table 8.3). In the cases of the United States and Germany, the values of 
the  standard deviation for daily and weekly  data are comparable  (compare 
tables 8.3 and 8.4). However, the volatilities of bond yields in Japan tend to be 
larger for the weekly data than for the daily. This suggests that the changes in 
bond yields exhibit little autocorrelation in the United States and Germany, but 
are positively autocorrelated in Japan. 
The first-order autocorrelations of yield changes are displayed in the rows 
labeled p. In fact, in the United States and Germany, the daily autocorrelations 
are typically less than .l in absolute value, though there is some evidence that 
6. Yields for the on-the-runs were typically not selected. because of the need to have a yield 
7. See section 8.3 for a description of the available futures contracts in each country and their 
8. Kikugawa and Singleton (1994) present similar descriptive statistics for the case of JGBs for 
history for calculating the statistics. 
delivery requirements. 
an earlier sainple period. They find similar patterns to those described subsequently. Table 8.2  Characteristics of Bonds 
Issue Size 
Maturity  Coupon  Issue Date  (million)  Commentsb 
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#I  I  I, ND 
#119, ND 
#129, TSE 10 yr 
#140, TSE 10 yr 
#145, TSE 10 yr 
#S02, ND 
#S10,  ND 
aAll bonds are noncallable. 
bND denotes not deliverable into a futures contract. CBTdenotes Chicago Board of Trade futures, 
and CBT Bond is the futures on the long bond. DTB denotes the Deutsche Terminborse, LIFFE 
denotes the London International Financial Futures Exchange, and TSE denotes the Tokyo Stock 
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Table 8.3  Descriptive Statistics for Daily Yield Changes, October 1, 
1991-November 30,1993 
United States 
Security  5/95  5/96  4/97  4/98  4/99  8/00  11/01  2/15  8/21 
Standard  .22  .I8  .I8  .I6  .I6  .I5  .I3  .I0  .09 
Kurtosis  4.27  4.10  3.85  3.49  3.82  3.80  3.62  3.36  3.47 
P  .06  .08*  .08*  .07  .07  .lo*  .09*  .01  .03 
deviation  .I6  .I3 
3.76  3.58 
.II*  .09* 
BOBL92  BOBL94 
Security  BUND  BUND 
Standard  .I 1  .II 
deviation  . I3  .I I 
Kurtosis  5.37  4.82 
7.32  4.62 
P  .0  I  .oo 
-.I0  -.05 
Germany 
BOBLOO  BOBL04  BUND  BUND  BUND  BUND 
BUND  BUND 
.08  .OX  .I2  .II  .08  .07 
.I0  .ox 
3.72  2.77  4.35  3.65  3.84  3.34 
5.34  5.43 
-.ox  -.05  .01  .05  -.02  .02 
-.I1  .09 
Japan 
Security  78  89  99  Ill  119  129  140  145  SO2  S10 
Standard  .I3  .I5  .I5  .IS  .I4  14  .13  .I2  .08  .07 
Kurtosis  12.33  9.83  8.04  6.59  6.70  5.51  4.86  4.24  5.26  5.02 
P  .40**  .31**  .28**  .20**  .18**  .08  .OS  .07  .19**  .2h** 
deviation 
Notes:  p denotes the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. * (**) denotes rejection of the null 
hypothesis of zero autocorrelation at the 5 percent (I percent) level, using hctcroskedastic standard 
errors (Hansen 1982). 
the low autocorrelation in daily U.S. data is statistically significant. The auto- 
correlations in the short-term BUNDs are also larger in absolute value than the 
autocorrelations of the corresponding BOBLs, but none of these estimates is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In contrast, yield changes in Ja- 
pan exhibit substantial positive autocorrelation, with p often larger than .2.  In 
all three countries, there is little evidence of autocorrelation in the weekly data, 
which suggests that the sources of persistence in Japan have effects that dissi- 
pate within a week. 
The kurtoses (K)  of the daily data are larger than three in all three countries, 
indicating that the distributions of yield changes have fatter tails than a nor- 
mal.9  The values of K for the United States are generally smaller than the corre- 
9. The kurtosis measures the shape of the tail region of a distribution. A kurtosis greater than 
three indicates that the probability of a “tail event”-that  is, a very large positive or negative yield 
change-is  higher in the sample than in a normal distribution with the same mean and variance. 253  Price Discovery in Cash and Futures Bond Markets 
Table 8.4  Descriptive Statistics for Weekly Yield Changes, October 4, 
1991-November 26,1993 
United States 
Security  5/95  5/96  4/97  4/98  4/99  8/00  11/01  2/15  8/21 
Standard  .22  .I9  .I8  .I8  .  I6  .I5  .I4  .I  1  .I0 
Kurtosis  3.40  3.32  3.11  2.92  3.41  3.45  3.32  3.06  3.09 
P  .01  .04  -.05  .06  -.I1  -.07  -.04  -.07  -.03 
deviation  .I7  .I4 
3.01  3.39 
-.01  -  .04 
Germany 
Security  BOBL92  BOBL94  BOBLOO  BOBLO4  BUND  BUND  BUND  BUND 
BUND  BUND  BUND  BUND 
~  ~  ~~ 
Standard  .I2  .I1  .I1  .I0  .09  .OX  .09  .09 
Kurtosis  6.41  5.29  2.80  3.15  5.71  3.89  3.74  3.44 
P  .o  1  .04  -.OX  -.I3  .OX  .06  .02  -.01 
deviation  .I3  .I2  .I0  .I0 
6.16  5.68  5.71  6.15 
-.05  -.05  .I0  .I0 
Japan 
Security  78  89  99  Ill  119  129  140  145  SO1  S10 
Standard  .I7  .I8  .I8  .I6  .I5  .I4  .I2  .I I  .09  .09 
Kurtosis  6.76  7.32  6.17  5.50  4.66  5.80  6.31  5.90  3.68  4.47 
P  .I6  .02  -.02  -.07  p.04  p.09  -.I1  .02  .I6  .20* 
deviation 
Notes; p denotes the first-order autocorrelation coefficient. *denotes rejection of the null hypothe- 
sis of zero autocorrelation at the 5 percent level, using heteroskedastic standard errors (Hansen 
1982). 
sponding  values  for Germany  and  Japan. The smaller values  of  K  for the 
weekly US.  data compared to the daily data suggest that the daily data may 
be nonnormal. 
The estimates of  K  for GGB and JGB yields are often much larger than 
three, especially for JGB yields. Furthermore, the sample kurtoses of the bonds 
with the highest values of K in the daily data also have estimated values of K 
much larger than three in the weekly data. Thus, the relatively high probabili- 
ties of large positive or negative yield changes in Germany and Japan seem to 
be associated with events that impact yields for at least a week. These compari- 
sons are, of course, subject to the well-known  caveat that kurtosis is deter- 
mined by the fourth moment of a distribution, and fourth moments are difficult 
to estimate accurately. 
Additional interesting patterns emerge when the results for different bonds 
with similar maturities are compared. In the United States, the pairs of bonds 254  Kenneth J. Singleton 
Table 8.5  Futures Contract Specifications 
Contract 
CBT  5 yrnote 
CBT  10 yr note 
CBT  BOND 
DTB  BOBL 
LIFFE  BOBL 
DTB  BUND 
LIFFE  BUND 











































dAverage  volume and open interest is a daily average for all contracts available for each futures 
with maturities April  1998 and November 2001 include one deliverable  and 
one nondeliverable bond for the associated futures contracts.'0 The results for 
each pair are virtually indistinguishable using both daily and weekly data. 
In the case of Germany, the first two pair of BOBLs and BUNDs have similar 
maturities, but neither is deliverable into a futures contract. The BOBLs in the 
third and fourth pairs of bonds are deliverable into a futures contract, while the 
associated BUNDs are not. The results for the first two pairs of bonds  are 
largely the same in both the daily and weekly data. On the other hand, for the 
third and fourth pairs of bonds, the values of K for the deliverable bonds are 
notably smaller than those for the nondeliverable bonds, and this is true in both 
daily and weekly data. 
The deliverable bonds in Japan were #129, #140, and #145 for a substantial 
part  of  the  sample period.  The values  of  K  for these bonds  are somewhat 
smaller than those for other JGBs in daily data, but not substantially so. More- 
over, there is little difference between the sample kurtoses of these bonds and 
those with shorter maturities in weekly data. What is most striking about the 
results for JGBs is the relatively low autocorrelation in yield changes for the 
deliverable bonds, especially in daily data. Whereas all of  the nondeliverable 
bonds have  first-order  autocorrelations  that  are  significantly  different  from 
zero at the  1 percent level and often much larger than  .2 in magnitude, the 
autocorrelations for the deliverable bonds are insignificantly  different from 
zero at conventional significance levels and are less than .1 in magnitude. 
Several  observations emerge from these findings.  First, changes in  bond 
yields in Germany and Japan have higher kurtoses and, in the case of Japan, 
much higher autocorrelations, than the UST yield changes. This is consistent 
with there being important effects of the institutional frictions in the cash mar- 
kets of Germany and Japan on the liquidity of GGBs and JGBs and hence the 
10. See table 8.  I  for a precise description of the bonds included. 255  Price Discovery in Cash and Futures Bond Markets 
distributions of yield changes compared to USTs. 
Second,  though  Japan  and  Germany have many  institutional  frictions  in 
common, the sample autocorrelation properties of the yield changes are very 
different. Two contributing  factors  to this  difference  may  be  the  relatively 
larger number of auctions along the German yield curve facilitating price dis- 
covery, and the more well-developed repo market in Germany. A more efficient 
borrowing and lending market for bonds reduces the price-pressure effects of 
trading large blocks through  the OTC dealer network  and, therefore, would 
be expected to reduce the propensity for adjacent price changes to have the 
same sign. 
Third, deliverability into a futures contract appears to alter the distributional 
properties of bond yields. Specifically, deliverable GGBs and JGBs have lower 
kurtoses and autocorrelations, respectively, than their nondeliverable counter- 
parts. One explanation for this finding is that price discovery is more effective 
in the futures markets in Japan and Germany, so the relatively illiquid deliver- 
able bonds are priced in terms of the associated futures. The results for Ger- 
many  suggest that this  pricing mechanism  affects primarily the deliverable 
bonds for which the cost-of-carry relation provides potential arbitrage opportu- 
nities. The relatively illiquid, nondeliverable BUNDs of comparable maturity 
to the BOBLOO and BOBL04 have much larger kurtoses, which suggests that 
price setting in the BUND market is not as closely tied to price formation in 
the futures market as price setting for BOBLs. 
Even if  largely true, my interpretation of the markets’ pricing rules is not 
complete, as the effects of delivery status on the distributions of bond yields 
differ across markets. With these differences in mind, I next describe briefly 
the characteristics of the primary futures markets in the United States, Ger- 
many, and Japan, and then examine in more depth the role of  futures in the 
price discovery process. 
8.3  Futures and Price Discovery in Cash Markets 
If futures are central to the pricing of illiquid, deliverable cash instruments, 
the distributions of cash and futures prices should exhibit similar characteris- 
tics. In general, they would not be identical, of course, because futures serve 
at least two additional  roles besides signaling value: bond futures are a key 
tool for managing interest rate risk associated with cash positions, and they 
provide a venue for investors to express views about the direction of interest 
rates. After briefly reviewing the contractual specifications of some of the key 
futures markets in the three countries being examined, I present preliminary 
results on the distributions of futures prices and their relations to cash prices. 
Table 8.5 displays the deliverability criteria for several bond futures markets. 
In the United States, there are three actively traded futures markets for Trea- 
sury notes and bonds. In the cases of the five- and ten-year note contracts, the 256  Kenneth J. Singleton 
original maturities of the notes must satisfy the maturity criterion for delivery 
to be deliverable. The trading activity in these futures increases with maturity, 
as is illustrated by the average daily volumes and open interest levels for No- 
vember 1993. 
The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) introduced 
the first BUND futures contract in 1988. Contractual obligations may be satis- 
fied by physical delivery of any BUNDs, Unity bonds, or Treuhands with matu- 
rities between 8.5 and 10 years. In 1990, the German DTB launched an identi- 
cal contract. The average daily trading volumes and open interest levels are 
higher on the LIFFE than on the DTB. Furthermore, the ratio of trading volume 
to open interest is higher at the LIFFE than at the DTB, suggesting that intra- 
day trading is also more pronounced at the LIFFE. 
A five-year futures contract  was introduced  by  the DTB in  1991, and re- 
cently the LIFFE introduced a similar five-year contract. BOBLs, SCHATZs, 
and TROBLs are deliverable into these contracts if their maturity is between 
3.5 and 5 years. Seasoned BUNDs are not deliverable. Among the two con- 
tracts, the DTB is clearly the more liquid (table 8.5), so price discovery within 
the five-year futures markets is likely to be primarily at the DTB. Also, com- 
paring the BUND and BOBL futures for November 1993, the ten-year contract 
had nearly seven times the trading volume and about twice the open interest as 
the five-year contracts combined. 
For the JGB contract, bonds with maturities between seven and eleven years 
are deliverable, though there are currently no deliverable bonds with maturities 
between ten and eleven years. Thus, bonds issued with original maturities of 
twenty years do not currently satisfy the deliverability requirements. 
The specific terms of these futures contracts differ in regard to the treatment 
of margin, the nature of “delivery” and “wild card” options, the conventions 
for computing conversion factors, the accounting treatment of gains and losses, 
and so forth. Moreover, whereas the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) and Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) impose daily price limits, there are no daily limits on 
the DTB or the LIFFE. These considerations  are clearly significant from the 
point of view of an individual investor computing the cost of a futures position 
and in assessing the likely effectiveness of a hedge. To the extent that these 
costs affect participation, the liquidities and depths of the futures markets may 
be enhanced or limited by their presence. An equally important determinant of 
the levels of trading activities in futures markets is the relative cost of  trading 
in cash compared to futures markets. The presence of the institutional frictions 
in the cash markets outlined in section 8.2, combined with the high degree of 
leverage achievable in the futures markets,  suggest that the relative costs of 
transacting  in the futures  market  are at times much lower than  in the cash 
market. This may explain the relative  liquidity of the futures markets, espe- 
cially in Japan and Germany. The higher costs of regulatory frictions in the 
cash markets may also increase the weight on futures prices in the price discov- 
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The notion that futures contracts are central to the pricing of cash instru- 
ments  can be made precise  through  the  standard cost-of-carry  relation. Let 
PN(t,)  and PN(tM)  denote the prices of a cash bond at the futures contracting and 
maturity dates, respectively. Suppose this bond pays c per year for each 100 of 
face value. Also, let i denote the annualized borrowing rate the investor must 
pay to finance the bond between  tc and tw  Let T  denote the fraction (tM -  tc)/ 
365 of  a year that the futures contract is active, andf'(tc)  denote the futures 
price at date t,  and CF the conversion factor for the Nth bond. Then the cost- 
of-carry relation for this market is 
CF Xf'(?J  = PN(tc)  X  [l + (i -  c/P"(t,))  X TI. 
The right side of equation (1) gives the "theoretical"  forward price implied by 
the cash price at the contract date and the terms for financing the investment, 
and the left side is the invoice price for delivery of the bond into the futures 
contract. Equivalently, for a given futures price and conversion factor, (1) im- 
plies that the present value of the adjusted futures price gives the current cash 
price: 
For at least two reasons, (2) will typically not hold for all deliverable bonds. 
First, there are biases inherent in using conversion factors to determine invoice 
prices for delivery. These biases will generally lead one bond to be cheapest- 
to-deliver (CTD; have the highest implied rep0 rate), which the futures price 
will tend to track over time. Second, as the shape of the yield curve changes 
during the futures contract period, so might the CTD bond. Since the futures 
track the price of the CTD bond, a potential change in the CTD bond adds an 
additional source of risk beyond the usual price risk of being long a futures 
contract. The difference  between the left and right  sides of  (2)  in the UST 
markets is often interpreted as the value of this delivery option implicit in the 
conversion factor system. In Germany and Japan, there seems to be little value 
to the delivery option. This may partly be a consequence of the narrower range 
of  deliverable  maturities  compared to  the  UST contract,  and to the  recent 
slopes of the deliverable yield curves. 
In its strongest form, pricing off futures can be formalized by  viewing (2) 
as a pricing rule the market uses to price the deliverable bonds: cash prices are 
set approximately to the discounted values of the associated conversion-factor- 
adjusted futures prices. A weaker interpretation is that there may be systematic 
deviations from the cost-of-carry relation, especially for non-CTD bonds, but 
the shape of the distribution of the futures largely determines the characteris- 
tics of  the distributions of cash prices in the deliverable sectors."  I examine 
each of these in turn, starting with the weaker notion. 
11. In some markets at some times, one need not restrict attention to deliverable bonds only. 
For example, for an extended period of time  in Japan during  1992, the superlong bonds were 258  Kenneth J. Singleton 
Descriptive statistics for daily changes in the logarithms of futures prices on 
the ten-year contracts and associated deliverable bond prices are presented in 
the last three columns of table 8.6. The bonds chosen were the 11/15/01 7.5% 
UST, the 9/20/01 8.25% BUND, and the 6/20/01 6.6% JGB #I40 (see table 
8.2 for the characteristics of these bonds). Pairwise comparisons of the sample 
statistics show that the distributional  characteristics  of  the cash and futures 
prices are very similar, with the only exception being the pair of kurtoses for 
the UST cash and futures prices. 
Further insights about the nature of both the volatilities and kurtoses of fu- 
tures and cash prices are obtained from estimating first-order generalized auto- 
regressive conditional  heteroskedasticity  (GARCH; Bollerslev  1986) models 
for the daily changes in prices. More precisely, changes in the logarithms of 
prices, Apr,  were assumed to be described by a normal distribution conditional 
on information available at date t -  1 with conditional mean Po + plApr-,  and 
conditional variance h,  given byL2 
(3)  h, = ag  + ‘Y,U:_,  + a$-,, 
where u, = (Apr -  Po -  PIAp,-,).  As noted by Bollerslev (1986) and others, 
(3) is a parsimonious  statistical representation that accommodates persistent 
conditional variances (a,  + a2  # 0) and the possibility that the marginal distri- 
bution of Apr is fat-tailed relative to a normal distribution. The excess kurtosis 
(relative to normal) in the context of a GARCH model can be expressed  as 
6a:(  1 -  a: -  2a,a2 -  3a;)-I.  Thus, the excess kurtosis is increasing in a,  if 
a,  > 0 and (1 -  a: -  aIaJ ’> 0, and is increasing in a2  if (a,  + al)  > 0. 
Table 8.6 displays the maximum likelihood estimates of the GARCH pard- 
meters for cash and futures prices under the assumption that the conditional 
distribution of u, is normal. The GARCH parameters a,  and a2  of the CBT T- 
note contract and the associated UST prices are insignificantly different from 
zero at conventional  significance levels. That the implied  excess kurtosis  is 
near zero was anticipated by  the results in table 8.3. The new information in 
table 8.6 is the evidence of weak temporal dependence in the conditional vari- 
ances of both UST cash and futures prices. 
There is much  stronger evidence  of  conditional  heteroskedasticity  in the 
prices  for the  German  and Japanese  markets,  and, within  each market,  the 
structures of  the conditional variances of cash and futures prices are strikingly 
similar.  The  autocovariances  of  the  squared  disturbances,  u:,  y,,  = Cov 
[u:, u:-,,],  are given by 
priced off the futures in the sense that price changes on twenty-year bonds moved one-to-one with 
changes in the JGB futures price. 
12. Without exception, the estimate of p,  was insignificantly different kom zero, so estimates 
of the parameters of the conditional mean are not reported subsequently. 259  Price Discovery in Cash and Futures Bond Markets 
Table 8.6  Descriptive Statistics for Futures and Individual Bond Prices: Daily 
Changes, October 1,1991-November 30,1993 
CBTT-note IOyr  1.16 X  lo-' 
(2.0 x  10  5, 
UST I1/15/01  4.63 x  10-6 
LIFFE BUND 10  yr 
BUND 9/20/01  3.98 x  lo-'** 
(7.30 x 
1.20 X  10  '* 
(3.68 X  10  ') 
(2.05 x  10  7) 
TSE JGB  10 yr  2.41  X  10  "* 
(6.66 X  10  ') 
JGB #I40  1.06 x  IO-O* 
(2.41 X  10  ') 
-.013 
(.030) 
-2.95  X  10 ' 









,287  4.40  ,0039  .01 
.643  3.53  ,0036  .07 
(I  .30) 
(.565) 
(.007) 
.886*  3.49  ,0021  -.02 
(.005) 
.428*  4.64  ,0027  .02 
(.110) 
.650*  4.46  ,0025  .05 
(.054) 
.732*  3.73  ,0024  p.05 
Notes:  Standard errors of  the estimates are in parentheses. *(**) indicates that  the  estimate is 
significantly different from zero at the  1%  (S%)  significance level. K  = kurtosis; IJ = standard 
deviation; p = firstborder autocorrelation of the changes in the bond or futures prices. CBTdenotes 
Chicago Board of Trade futures, LIFFE denotes the London International Financial Futures Ex- 
change, and TSE denotes the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
where yo = ut,  the variance of u,. It follows that the rates at which the autoco- 
variances of squared residuals decay in Germany and Japan are very similar. 
Nevertheless, the distributions of the conditional variances are notably differ- 
ent. Compared with the German LIFFE contract, a given percentage change in 
the TSE futures price at date t - 1, u,-  , ,  has a much larger impact effect on 
the conditional variance, and the effects of shocks dissipate more rapidly in 
Japan than in Germany. Consequently, the mean lag in the conditional variance 
equation (expressed as a function of past squared shocks) is about 3.7 days for 
the LIFFE BUND future and 1.7 days for the TSE JGB future.I3 
All of these findings are consistent with the view that deliverable, cash in- 
struments inherit the distributional  properties  of futures. Changes in futures 
prices exhibit little autocorrelation, and this may explain the low autocorrela- 
tion of changes in JGB prices for deliverable bonds (table 8.3) compared to 
nondeliverable bonds. Moreover, the high kurtoses of all cash bonds in Japan 
is consistent with the high kurtosis of the JGB futures price (the highest among 
the securities considered). Similarly, the relatively low kurtoses for deliverable 
German bonds compared to nondeliverable bonds can be explained by the low 
kurtosis of the LIFFE BUND futures contract  and the relative liquidity and 
depth of the futures compared to the cash market. 
While these pairwise, cash-futures comparisons are suggestive of a key role 
for futures in price discovery, I have not documented a close linkage for the 
entire deliverable sector. Such evidence is presented in Kikugawa and Single- 
13. See Bollerslev (1986) for the formula for the mean lag 5.64 : 
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ton (1994), where it is shown that the deliverable sector in Japan was essen- 
tially priced directly off futures during much of 1992. Figure 8.1A displays the 
actual bond equivalent yields (BEYS; dark squares, labeled with bond num- 
bers) of the JGBs in the deliverable sector on May 20, 1992, and the BEYS 
implied  by  the conversion-factor-adjusted  futures prices  discounted by  the 
common implied rep0 rate on the CTD bond (i.e., BEYS implied by equation 
[3] with i set at the implied rep0 rate of the CTD bond). Consistent with pricing 
off futures, the two lines are virtually identical. The exceptions are #129, which 
was the benchmark at the time, and #144 and #145. The richness of the latter 
two bonds probably reflected the market's assessment of their potential bench- 
mark status in the future; #145 became the subsequent benchmark. 
Figure 8.1B displays the comparable yield curves for July 22,  1992. The 
shortest-maturity deliverable bond on this date was #122. Furthermore,  the 
coupon rates on #127 and below are under 6 percent, while the coupon rates 
for #128-#144 are equal to or greater than 6 percent. For several months prior 
to April  1992, the low coupon, intermediate-maturity  bonds were trading at 
relatively high yields  and with light trading  volumes, and there was a pro- 
nounced hump in the yield curve over the five- to seven-year sector. Between 
May and July 1992, the JGB market experienced a strong rally, especially in 
the five- to seven-year maturity sector of the yield curve. As trading activity 
increased in the low coupon nondeliverable bonds, the price discovery process 
changed for the similar low coupon deliverable bonds. Instead of being based 262  Kenneth J. Singleton 
on the bond  future,  which  was  tracking  the  longer-maturity  higher  coupon 
bond prices (#130-#144), the prices of #I22 to #128 were set in relation to the 
more comparable low coupon (nondeliverable) #105, #I 11, and #I 19. 
There are two complementary interpretations of this change in casMfutures 
price relations. First, the increased trading activity during July in the nondeliv- 
erable sector provided cash market benchmarks for pricing the short-maturity, 
deliverable bonds with comparable durations. Less weight was therefore given 
to the futures. A second, related consideration was that a market rally lead to 
the complete disappearance  of a pronounced  hump in the five- to seven-year 
sector of the JGB yield curve and a substantial steepening of the curve. Exact 
pricing off futures constrains the shape of  the yield curve in the deliverable 
sector. Although the futures-implied yield curve steepens in a rally, the actual 
yield curve became much steeper than the futures-implied yield curve. Concur- 
rently,  the  market  priced  in  the  shape of  the curve. Thus, as yield  curves 
steepen or flatten to the point that pricing off futures would create substantial 
arbitrage opportunities at the boundaries of the deliverable sector, market pric- 
ing reflects the importance of curve steepness.  I4 Notice, however, that pricing 
cash bonds in terms of the futures is not a phenomenon that occurs only when 
market yields are near the notional yield on the futures. In late fall of  1992, 
there was a sell-off in the intermediate JGBs, and on November 20, 1992, for 
instance, the futures and implied yield curves were once again virtually indis- 
tinguishable (fig. S.lC), with market yields well below 5 percent.15 
Though the close relation between the cash and futures prices in figure 8.1 
is striking, it is important to recognize that these patterns can exist yet there 
can be significant departures from the cost-of-carry relation for all bonds. The 
curves in figure 8.1 were derived by  using the implied rep0 rate on the then 
current CTD in the right-hand  side of (2) to compute implied cash prices. If 
the futures become very cheap (for instance) relative to cash, then this will be 
“absorbed” into the implied rep0 rate for the CTD. What figure 8.1 demon- 
strates is that the same implied rep0 rate priced all deliverable bonds during 
extended periods in 1992. 
The absence of a well-developed rep0 market and the consequent high costs 
of shorting cash bonds mean that many market participants rely on the futures 
market for short selling. The consequent selling pressure on the futures rnar- 
14. In Japan, there were times during late 1991 and early 1992 when the gap between the yields 
on the shortest-maturity deliverable bond and the longest-maturity nondeliverahle bond was over 
fifteen bp just before the expiration of the futures contract. Initially this gap represented a near- 
riskless trade opportunity in that, once the deliverable bond lost its delivery status (after expiration 
of the futures Contract), it cheapened up to a comparable yield  as other nearby  nondeliverahle 
bonds. Once this opportunity was recognized by most market participants, however, the gap was 
not tradable. TSE closing prices at times showed a yield gap. but no trades were being executed 
at TSE prices. As the intermediate sector rallied in mid-1992, such gaps largely disappeared. 
15. Similar pricing in terms of futures has been observed in Germany. The recent steepening of 
the German yield curve has similarly  led to discrcpancie9 between the futures-implied and actual 
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kets leads at times to the futures price in fact being very cheap relative to the 
cash market. The effects of  these frictions can be seen graphically in figure 
8.2, which displays the time series of implied rep0 rates on the CTDs (which 
change across contracts) relative to the short-term London interbank offer rate 
(LIBOR) for yen. Notice that for most of the first half of  1992, when there was 
pricing off futures in Japan, the differences between the implied repo (CRPO) 
and LIBOR (R)  were relatively small. Thus, pricing off futures was approxi- 
mately based on the cost-of-carry relation. Subsequently, LIBOR and the im- 
plied rep0 rate on the CTD bond have differed by up to one hundred bp. Thus, 
pricing of the cash market reflected the markets'  assessment of an appropriate 
spread between the implied rep0 rates and LIBOR given the forces of  supply 
and demand and the costs preventing attempts to arbitrage this gap. 
8.4  Concluding Remarks 
I have argued that there are important links between the institutional settings 
within which investors perform price discovery and the resulting distributions 
,  .v---TTT  I LC''--.  -  ~~  ~~~~~ 
Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jon  Feb  Mor  Apr  Hog  Jun  Jul  hug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Jon  Feb 
92 
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Fig. 8.2  Implied rep0 on CTD bond and short-term rate, Japan, September 2, 
1991-November 15,1993 
Source: Data provided by Goldman Sachs and Co. 
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of prices of fixed-income instruments. In environments like the United States, 
liquid UST markets are facilitated by regular auctions of new bonds of various 
maturities, “market-to-market’’ accounting, electronic settlement, a competi- 
tive dealer market  with  low transaction  costs,  and an active borrowing  and 
lending market that makes selling short a low-cost endeavor. The institutional 
settings in Germany and Japan involve many more frictions, which inhibit price 
discovery in the cash markets. The empirical evidence suggests that these insti- 
tutional factors are reflected in fatter-tailed  distributions  and, in the case of 
Japan, substantial autocorrelation of yield changes. 
In the presence of institutional frictions in the cash markets, the relatively 
frictionless and liquid futures markets play more central roles in the price dis- 
covery process. This was reflected in the distributions of yields for cash bonds 
having notably different characteristics depending on whether the bonds were 
deliverable into a futures contract or nondeliverable. Moreover,  the distribu- 
tions of the cash and futures prices within the deliverable sectors were very 
similar. More direct evidence of the importance of futures for price discovery 
was presented for Japan, where the cash prices of all deliverable bonds were 
shown to have been, at times, set approximately to their associated conversion- 
factor-adjusted futures prices. 
The evidence presented for Japan on pricing off futures is an extreme case. 
Indeed, the results suggest that nearly exact pricing off futures persisted for 
several months, but recently the prices in the cash market and those implied 
by the futures have differed by amounts that are more typical of markets in the 
United  States. The recent patterns  are consistent with the increased  trading 
activity along the JGB yield curve, which would facilitate price discovery  in 
the cash market. Also, though the focus has been on deliverable versus nonde- 
liverable bonds, the thesis that cash and futures prices may be closely related 
during periods of  low volume in the cash market suggests that under some 
circumstances pricing off futures might extend to bonds outside the deliverable 
sector. This was in fact the case in Japan during some periods in the past. 
Specifically,  the  superlong (twenty-year)  bonds were  for a  while  priced  in 
terms of the futures. 
Many questions remain for future study. In particular, why is the distribution 
of futures prices in Japan fat-tailed relative to the futures prices for the United 
States and Germany? I conjecture that the high borrowing and lending costs in 
the cash market, which contribute to the systematic violations in the cost-of- 
carry relation for the CTD bond, at least partially explain this result. If futures 
are the primary vehicle for shorting bonds, then the effects of institutional fric- 
tions in the cash market will spill over and help shape the distribution of the 
futures prices. Also, are the joint distributions of the cash and futures prices 
different for the five- and ten-year futures in Germany? These markets differ 
in their organizational design. Equally, if not more, important, the relative li- 
quidities of the cash and futures markets appear to be different across the two 
sectors of the yield curve. A more thorough analysis of these differences using 265  Price Discovery in Cash and Futures Bond Markets 
a bivariate model may be enlightening. In the cases of both Japan and Germany, 
establishing a tighter link between trading activity in the cash market and the 
correlation between cash and futures prices would be useful for verifying the 
conjectured links between these features of the markets. Addressing these is- 
sues requires the development of a much richer database of volume data and 
time series on the implied forward prices for individual bonds using equation 
(2). In future research, I plan to develop such databases for Japan and Germany 
and examine spillovers between cash and futures markets. 
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Comment  William P. Albrecht 
In this paper Kenneth Singleton approaches the question of what might cause 
a market to be efficient  (or inefficient)  from a broader perspective than the 
typical market microstructure paper. He examines how what he calls macroin- 
stitutional arrangements can affect price discovery  and the relationship be- 
tween cash and futures markets. The purpose of the paper, therefore, is not to 
debate whether the cash or futures market is more efficient or whether the cash 
market drives the futures market or vice versa. Singleton does not attempt to 
show  that  one  market  is  necessarily  more  or less efficient  than  the  other. 
Rather, he demonstrates that a market with fewer impediments to using it is 
more efficient than one with more impediments to using it. 
It would be very comforting if the political discussion about the relationship 
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between cash and derivative markets would adopt this perspective more often. 
If this were to occur, governmental agencies that are concerned about why a 
market is not working well would spend more time looking for restrictions on 
voluntary exchange that may be responsible for the poor performance. This, in 
turn, would lead them to devote more resources to the task of eliminating such 
restrictions. The result would be a better balance in the types of activities en- 
gaged in by many governmental agencies. That is, they would spend more time 
looking for ways to remove restrictions on voluntary exchange and less time 
looking for ways to impose additional restrictions. 
The basic structure and approach of this paper are quite sound. Singleton’s 
macroapproach is appropriate. The purpose of this paper is set out quite clearly 
in the introduction, and the main conclusions appear to be consistent with the 
data and the  statistical analysis. There are, however, a number  of questions 
raised by Singleton that are not fully answered. The explanations of his results 
are not as well tied together as they might be, and there is an ad hoc nature to 
some of the explanations of the statistical results. This reader was left with the 
feeling that there is more to the story than is presented in the paper. There is, 
of course, always more to the story, but in this case telling a somewhat fuller 
story would be very helpful. 
First, a number of statements about the markets in Germany and Japan raise 
interesting questions. Why, for example, are Treuhand and TROBLs not treated 
by the market as equivalent to their BOBL and BUND counterparts? Another 
example concerns the benchmark bonds. We learn that these bonds are desig- 
nated in Japan, but it would be interesting to know more about how and why 
bonds are so designated. Not only would at least some readers be interested in 
the answers to these questions,  but they might have some relevance for the 
analysis in the paper. 
For the same reasons, I would like to know more about why the benchmark 
premium in Japan fluctuates and why certain ex-benchmark bonds often serve 
as key reference points for pricing. One reason cited is that they have large 
issue sizes, but surely that is why they were benchmarks. Are there other rea- 
sons? Or do all ex-benchmarks serve this function? A fuller discussion of  how 
the lack of a rep0 market in Japan affects price discovery would also be useful. 
Singleton says that the absence of a well-developed rep0 market means that 
many market participants rely on futures markets for short selling, thereby put- 
ting downward pressure on futures prices. This, he says, causes a substantial 
bias toward futures’ being cheap relative to cash bonds. Since the use of futures 
for price discovery  is a central theme of the paper, this issue would  seem to 
merit more examination. 
There also appear to be some problems with  identifying  and explaining 
cause and effect. The paper states, for example, that increased trading in July 
1992 in the nondeliverable sector provided cash market alternative benchmarks 
for price discovery. This is cited as an illustration of the prevalent phenomenon 
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over time. But what causes these liquidities to change? Or is the point simply 
that, when volume is high in the cash market, it is used for price discovery? 
Some further discussion of autocorrelation  and kurtosis would  also help. 
Why, for example, do changes in bond yields in Japan show positive autocorre- 
lation for daily but not for weekly data? On the kurtosis issue, all three coun- 
tries have fatter tails than normal for changes in yield, but the values of K are 
smaller for the United  States. The paper  also reports that there  are smaller 
values of K for weekly  data but it does not make clear exactly where these 
values are smaller. Nor does it explain the significance of this finding. 
Finally, some of the explanations of the results that are offered in the paper 
are tentative or incomplete. For example, “two contributing factors to this dif- 
ference may be the relatively larger number of auctions along the German yield 
curve facilitating price discovery, and the more well-developed rep0 market in 
Germany.” And “even if largely true, my interpretation of the markets’ pricing 
rules is not complete, as the effects of delivery status on the distributions of 
bond yields differ across markets.” 
A paper that presents as much information and analysis as this is bound to 
leave a number  of  unanswered  and partially  answered questions.  Singleton 
cannot possibly  address all the issues raised. These comments, in fact, point 
out the hazards of presenting so much information and raising so many issues. 
On the one hand, 1  have suggested that he try to provide answers to questions 
suggested but not explicitly addressed by the paper. On the other hand, I have 
complained about the tentative nature of the explanations when they are of- 
fered. Moreover, I undoubtedly would have complained if Singleton had been 
less tentative, on the grounds that his analysis does not support stronger an- 
swers. But, as I said earlier, there is more to the story than is presented in the 
paper. It would benefit from a concerted effort to tie up as many loose ends 
as possible. 
Some of the aforementioned task could be accomplished by fuller explana- 
tions of some of the characteristics of the markets in Japan and Germany. Some 
of it could be accomplished by a section near the end of the paper that summa- 
rizes the major unanswered or partially answered questions and that discusses 
their significance for the paper’s conclusions. These steps would improve what 
is already a solid paper-one  that adds to our understanding of how the mar- 
kets under discussion work. 
Comment  T.  EI~C  Kilcollin 
I found it very difficult to review this paper since there’s not much here you 
can really sink your teeth into: There is no well-defined hypothesis to be tested; 
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rather, as Singleton says in the paper, he’s trying to characterize the properties 
of the joint distribution of cash and futures prices in order to guide modeling 
efforts in the future. He provides some institutional details about government 
securities and futures markets, but it is by no means a definitive treatment of 
these issues. He provides some data; but they, too, are certainly not exhaustive. 
Finally, he provides some statistics; but they, too, could certainly be expanded 
upon. 
Fundamentally, the story line of the paper is that a host of largely unspeci- 
fied accounting,  regulatory,  and  cultural  differences  somehow  aggregate  to 
produce a Japanese government bond market that is less efficient than that of 
Germany, which, in turn, is less efficient than that of the United States. Some- 
how the futures markets escape these differences and are efficient in all three 
countries, and this relative efficiency spills over into the cash markets for deliv- 
erable securities in Germany and Japan. 
The principal hypothesis is that, where cash markets don’t work well, futures 
markets improve or at least affect cash market pricing. But we only have three 
data points (United States, Germany, and Japan) to test this hypothesis. 
Clearly there are lots of holes in this study: for example, I did a paper on 
the various schemes for making a variety of  bond issues deliverable against 
futures contracts (Kilcollin 1982). In that paper, I showed that, with the factor 
pricing scheme that these futures contracts use, the relation between the futures 
price and the prices of the various deliverable bonds is a complicated function 
that depends on the term structure of  interest rates, the coupon  structure of 
interest rates, and the general level of interest rates in relation to the par deliv- 
ery instrument. It also depends on the volatility of these parameters. The JGB 
yield curve in Singleton’s figure 8.1 may well be simply a reflection  of these 
factors at work, rather than any tendency to price some cash bonds off futures 
prices. 
As another example, Singleton notes that the JGB bonds that are deliverable 
against the futures contract have low autocorrelations.  But these bonds also 
happen to be the highest-coupon, longest-maturity, and largest-issue bonds in 
his sample. How do we know it is deliverability against futures instead of these 
other factors that account for the autocorrelation numbers? 
As a final example, Singleton asserts that the futures markets are largely free 
of the accounting, regulatory, and cultural influences he postulates for the cash 
markets. In the United States this is certainly not the case. U.S. futures markets 
have more regulation and are subject to more accounting anomalies than is the 
government securities market. The futures markets in Germany and Japan are 
also subjected to heavy regulation. 
Notwithstanding  these criticisms, there is an intuitive appeal to Singleton’s 
findings-they  just need more work. Longer time series covering more market 
conditions would bolster confidence that these results are real. Also, I’d like to 
see the factor-pricing issue investigated more fully. Some bonds, while legally 
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behavior be influenced by futures prices? Can other factors that might generate 
these results be ruled out? Ultimately,  I don’t think the “macro” relations of 
concern in this paper can be convincingly tested  using a single set of data. 
Rather, it will be scraps of evidence from a variety of sources that together will 
support or reject Singleton’s hypothesis. 
I would suggest Singleton expand the range of his data. Certainly, France, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia  could be included.  Italy and Spain also 
have newer futures markets that might shed light on his hypothesis. I would 
also suggest looking at agricultural markets. There is a great variety of regula- 
tory and “cultural” differences in these markets, and it is usual in agricultural 
markets for futures to be the main price discovery mechanism. 
Finally, I  would like to venture into the normative economics that Martin 
Feldstein warned us against. Suppose we find that futures markets do influence 
the distribution of cash market prices. Is this good or bad? Low autocorrela- 
tions seem desirable, but how about fat-tailed distributions? The Brady com- 
mission seemed convinced that futures cause fat-tails in equity market prices 
and that this is bad. Singleton finds the opposite and seems to believe that this 
is good. I’d like to see some discussion in future versions of this paper of what 
Singleton’s work implies about economic efficiency. 
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Author’s Reply 
Let me begin by taking a broader perspective on the research agenda for which 
this paper represents an early progress report. Virtually all models of the term 
structure of  interest rates that are studied in the finance literature or used in 
practice by the investment community assume the absence of arbitrage oppor- 
tunities and frictionless markets. Though there are in fact many institutional 
and regulatory restrictions on trading practices, these models have proven to 
be useful abstractions for the US. Treasury bond markets. For other govem- 
ment bond markets, bond swaps along the maturity  spectrum, short selling, 
and other trade strategies that potentially  bring market prices approximately 
in line with the implications of models assuming frictionless markets may be 
significantly  limited. This has been the case for Japan and Germany. Bonds 
of nearly  identical  maturities  are priced to reflect  accounting  standards and 
transaction costs that impinge on these bonds in substantially different ways. 
In other words, the market effectively uses different discount functions to value 
the cash flows of these bonds. These observations have important implications 
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Consider for instance the problem of risk management. Typically, the pri- 
mary objective is to find the portfolio of securities that matches the price move- 
ments of the target security. Clearly, whether prices track each other depends 
fundamentally on how the market sets prices. And price discovery is not inde- 
pendent of the institutional frictions faced by investors. This paper represents 
the first step of a longer-term research agenda attempting to expand our under- 
standing of the relations between price discovery and the institutionalhegula- 
tory environment in which trades are undertaken. What surprised me, and may 
surprise others, is the extent to which the distributions of  bond yields differ 
with  maturity  in  Japan  and  Germany,  and  how  they  differ  across  markets. 
These differences represent in my view serious challenges for existing valua- 
tion models as well as for the design of effective hedging strategies. 
The comparison across the bond markets of the United States, Germany, and 
Japan suggests that some of these differences can be explained by differences 
in the cost structures of market making, institutional frictions that affect liquid- 
ity, and the issuing practices of federal authorities. To draw out the relations 
between market structure and the distributions of yields and to gain some in- 
sight into how price discovery is accomplished  in the presence of significant 
frictions, I explored the linkages between cash and futures prices. Regulatory 
guidelines and accounting standards appear to have contributed significantly 
to illiquidity in the cash market and a consequent greater reliance on the rela- 
tively liquid futures for price discovery in cash markets. This in turn can ex- 
plain the substantial differences in distributions of bond yields along the yield 
curves and across countries, 
Popular and political debates about the economic consequences of financial 
regulation  often  focus on  specific aspects of  contract  design  for derivative 
instruments. In particular, the focus is often on how regulatory change (e.g., 
margin  requirements  or circuit  breakers)  affects the costs of  the economic 
insurance that a security provides. These issues are clearly important for de- 
termining  competitive  advantage  among  providers  of  insurance  (the  ex- 
changes) and influencing risk management strategies of investors. 
More fundamentally, regulation may affect the nature of the insurance pro- 
vided by the security (i.e., its payoff distribution conditional on the state of the 
economy). In Japan and perhaps Germany, the steps being contemplated  to- 
ward  liberalization of bond markets are as much of the latter variety  as the 
former, in part because these countries are at earlier stages of the liberalization 
process. For this reason, I believe that the more “macro” costs associated with 
market access, settlement, legality and costs of certain collateralized loans, and 
so forth, are much more significant for understanding price discovery in these 
markets than changes in the remaining regulations related to the design of fu- 
tures contracts. In this regard, Kilcollin’s comments suggest that he is fixated 
on regulations in the futures market that may be of second-order importance 
for price discovery rather than the more important issues facing countries that 
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I now turn to the specific comments of the discussants. Albrecht raises sev- 
eral interesting issues that were not fully addressed, and, as he suggests might 
be the case, the answers provide further support for the thesis of this paper. 
Addressing them in order, let me begin with the apparent differential treatment 
of Treuhands and BUNDs by the market. Treuhand will continue issuing until 
1995, at which time it will become part of the Bundespost system. Bonds is- 
sued by the latter institution have recently been trading at about a thirty-basis- 
point spread to BUNDs, so investors are unsure how Treuhands will be priced 
in  the market after they lose their deliverability status in the ten-year  sector. 
Consequently, they trade cheap to BUNDs and are typically cheapest to deliver. 
In contrast, in the five-year sector, when TROBLs lose their deliverability sta- 
tus and Treuhand joins the Bundespost system, TROBLs will have about two 
years remaining until maturity, and most two-year bonds have been liquid and 
have little credit risk. Therefore the spreads of TROBLs to BOBLs have been 
much smaller. 
Next Albrecht wonders about the benchmark selection process in Japan. The 
benchmark bond must have a large enough issue size to accommodate the high 
volume of trading and trade near par so that accounting considerations will not 
render the bond unattractive to many investors. At times the change in bench- 
mark is perfectly predictable. This was the case, for example, with #157. The 
change date was the first trading date of the new settlement period after the 
first coupon payment.  The coupon date is significant,  because  this  is when 
the  various  tranches  of  the  #157  merged  into  one  tranche,  and hence  all 
of the tranches traded as the same bond. A new benchmark was expected be- 
cause the market had rallied, making #145 a premium bond. On the other hand, 
as figure 8.1 suggests, there was considerable uncertainty about which bond 
would follow #129 as the benchmark. Again issue size’ and coupon were im- 
portant factors, as were the changes in market prices before the tranches were 
combined. However, there are no explicitly stated criteria for selecting the new 
benchmark. Rather, the largest securities companies in Japan seem to have se- 
lected both the bond and the change over date. 
As for the role of ex-benchmark bonds serving as reference bonds for pric- 
ing, yes, it is the case that all ex-benchmark bonds have tended to play this 
role. In addition, there are a few bonds that were never benchmarks that have 
also at times served as pricing reference points.  Examples include #99 and 
#140. 
Albrecht’s concern that the absence of a well-developed rep0 market in Ja- 
pan may compromise price discovery based on futures is well taken. This issue 
is addressed at the end of section 8.3. To reiterate, during the period that there 
was evidently nearly exact pricing of cash bonds in terms of futures through 
the  cost-of-cany relation,  the  implied  rep0  rate  on  the  cheapest-to-deliver 
I. Bear in mind that between 60 and 90 percent of the trading volume in all Japanese government 
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(CTD) bond and LIBOR were very close to each other.? In other words, there 
was essentially no bias in the pricing of futures. At other times, however, this 
bias has been substantial, as is evidenced  in figure 8.2. To the extent that a 
subset of  the deliverable yield  curve was priced  off  futures  during periods 
when the implied rep0 rate of the CTD and LIBOR differed, the market was 
basing pricing on both futures and a perceived reasonable spread between the 
two short-term rates, given supply and demand factors and the cost of shorting 
bonds. The periods during which the gaps between  LIBOR and the implied 
repo rates on the CTD were largest correspond to periods during which cash 
and implied prices from futures evidenced the largest differences. 
The high costs of market making in Japan open the possibility that large 
blocks of bonds will move though the dealer network slowly relative to a com- 
parable block in the United States.  Also, accounting factors, for example, may 
lead many domestic institutional accounts to be on the same side of the market 
at the same time. For example, if bonds were bought and booked at par and 
the market subsequently sold off, then there would be tendency for these bonds 
to be held in portfolios, thereby reducing the effective supply to the market. 
On the other hand, as the price of these bonds approaches par in a subsequent 
rally, trading activity may pick up as accounting constraints become less im- 
portant for these bonds in portfolio rebalancings. In this manner, institutional 
and accounting factors can lead to large and persistent moves in Japanese gov- 
ernment bond (JGB) yields that manifest themselves in large kurtoses and high 
auto correlation^.^ 
Many of Kilcollin’s remarks are factually wrong and his proposed reinterpre- 
tations of the evidence suggest that he failed to grasp the meaning of  the eco- 
nomic concept  of price discovery. The suggestion that the conversion factor 
system itself can explain the patterns in figure 8.1 and in Kikugawa and Single- 
ton (1994) is completely  unsubstantiated.  Indeed, the biases inherent  in the 
conversion factor system are well known to induce a single CTD bond, and not 
the documented pattern of  many deliverable bonds being nearly equally CTD 
for a period of  months. 
Kilcollin’s remarks about autocorrelation  and the assertion that I claim fu- 
tures markets are largely free of regulation show that he did not carefully read 
the paper. Many  of the specific accounting  and regulatory factors discussed 
pertain to the cash markets; as noted in the introduction, the regulations related 
2. Even though there was nearly exact pricing of the deliverable sector in terms of the futures 
price, a cheapest to deliver still existed, because the institutional and accounting factors usually 
implied that one bond would be slightly cheaper to deliver than  all other candidate bonds. The 
differences in implied repo rates were small, however. 
3. Some of the autocorrelation may  also be due to the price quotation system for JGBs. The 
prices are Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) closing prices, which may not be exactly equal to transac- 
tion prices. This problem is more severe than an infrequent trading problem, since the TSE prices 
are set by  one of the big four securities firms and need not be exactly equal to a recent market 
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to margin and contract design for futures are not the focus of this paper. Addi- 
tionally, some of the relative advantages of executing certain trades in futures 
markets brought about by  these cash market  frictions are spelled out in the 
paper. 
As for his remarks about autocorrelation, contrary to his claim, the deliver- 
able bonds are not the longest-maturity bonds examined for Japan. The twenty- 
year bonds are not deliverable  and evidenced high autocorrelations. Similar 
autocorrelations and kurtoses are obtained in studies of yields for high coupon 
superlong bonds. Also, compared to say #140, there are other, nondeliverable 
bonds with higher coupons and larger issue sizes. This is clearly displayed in 
table  8.2. Moreover,  for  an  earlier  sample period  Kikugawa  and  Singleton 
(1994) found that #I 11 and #I 19 bonds also exhibited relatively low autocorre- 
lations compared to nondeliverable bonds. Table 8.3 shows that market condi- 
tions changed in such a way  that these bonds became significantly  autocor- 
related. 
Finally, I agree with both discussants that more analysis is needed to link 
more tightly the empirical evidence to the institutional frictions emphasized. 
This will be the focus of future research. Rather than expanding the scope of 
the analysis by considering more countries, I am expanding the set of variables 
used in the empirical analysis in an attempt to better understand the three mar- 
kets considered in this paper. 
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